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Introduction	
	In	 finance,	 systemic	 risk	 is	 the	 risk	of	 collapse	of	 an	 entire	 financial	 system	or	entire	 market,	 as	 opposed	 to	 risk	 associated	 with	 any	 one	 individual	 entity,	group	 or	 component	 of	 a	 system,	 which	 can	 be	 contained	 therein	 without	harming	 the	 entire	 system.	 It	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 "financial	 system	 instability,	potentially	 catastrophic,	 caused	 or	 exacerbated	 by	 idiosyncratic	 events	 or	conditions	 in	 financial	 intermediaries".	 It	 refers	 to	 the	 risks	 imposed	 by	interlinkages	and	interdependencies	in	a	system	or	market,	where	the	failure	of	a	 single	 entity	 or	 cluster	 of	 entities	 can	 cause	 a	 cascading	 failure,	which	 could	potentially	bankrupt	or	bring	down	the	entire	system	or	market.1		This	definition	can	clearly	be	applied	to	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008	and	to	all	its	constituting	parties,	be	they	the	banking	sector,	the	mortgage	bondholders	or	 the	 collective	 of	 individual	mortgagors	 in	 the	U.S.	 The	 systemic	 risks	 to	 the	lenders	 have	 been	well	 documented,	 but	 for	 the	 borrowers	 the	 same	does	 not	apply.	For	 the	 latter,	 the	 fact	 that,	 between	2005	and	2014,	more	 than	45%	of	homeowner-occupiers	 with	 a	 mortgage	 were	 confronted	 with	 foreclosure	proceedings,	 implies	 that	 the	 funding	 structure	 of	 the	 total	 U.S.	 mortgage	portfolio	 made	 mortgagors	 vulnerable	 to	 loan	 default	 pressures:	 a	 serious	systemic	risk	for	mortgagors.		Such	pressures	do	not	arise	overnight,	but	rather	over	a	number	of	years.	How	this	pressure	did	grow,	will	 be	 shown	with	 the	help	of	 two	 indices:	 one	which	shows	 the	 link	 between	mortgage	 debt	 to	 income	 by	 comparing	 the	 total	 U.S.	mortgage	debt	with	the	nominal	GDP	levels	and	the	second	one	the	link	between	the	annual	mortgage	lending	volumes	and	the	average	new	house	prices	during	the	same	years.	The	second	one	 is	split	 into	one	 index	based	on	actual	average	house	 prices	 and	 another	 one	 on	 house	 prices	 adjusted	 for	 CPI	 inflation.	 The	paper	covers	the	period	from	1997-2015.		One	 cannot	 solve	 household’	 systemic	 risk	 factors	 as	 if	 this	 is	 an	 individual	household’s	 own	 problem.	 It	 was	 a	 collective	 problem	 caused	 by	 systemic	factors.	Managing	such	events	should	have	been	organized	on	a	collective	basis.		The	 sooner	 it	 is	 recognized	 that	 the	 collective	 of	 mortgagors	 can	 experience	systemic	risk	pressures	–just	like	banks	and	mortgage	bondholders-,	the	quicker	solutions	can	be	found	to	overcome	such	pressures.	If,	by	2003,	the	priority	had	been	given	to	solving	systemic	risks	to	the	U.S.	mortgagors,	the	U.S.	and	quite	a	few	other	countries	would	have	been	in	a	much	better	place	at	present.	
	
	
	
																																																									1	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemic_risk	
	 4	
																	G-SIBOs	(Global	Systemically	Important	But	Overlooked)	The	Collective	of	U.S.	Households©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning	
	
1.	Measuring	systemic	risks	for	U.S.	mortgagors	
	The	ability	to	service	outstanding	mortgage	debt	depends	on	two	factors:	firstly	the	 income	 levels	 of	 the	 mortgagor	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 outgoing	 mortgage	service	payments	and	secondly	on	the	price	development	of	new	homes	and	the	amount	of	mortgage	lending	used	per	time	period.		Systemic	 risks	 occur	 for	 households	 because	 granting	 a	 mortgage	 to	 an	individual	household	is	not	just	a	stand-alone	action.	In	any	particular	year	this	type	of	action	is	multiplied	many	times	over.	A	comparison	can	be	drawn	with	a	large	conglomerate	company.	If	banks	lend	to	such	companies,	they	ensure	that	there	are	loan	covenants	in	place	in	the	loan	agreements,	covering	such	facts	as	a	minimum	equity	capital	and	a	gearing	ratio	measuring	the	volume	of	borrowed	funds	 set	 off	 against	 the	 equity	 capital.	 Of	 course	 the	 latter	 is,	 in	 a	 dynamic	setting,	based	on	the	earnings	capacity	of	the	company.	Competing	banks	cannot,	just	 on	 their	 own,	 decide	 to	 lend	 additional	 sums	 of	 money	 to	 this	 company	irrespective	of	the	existing	lending	levels.	If	they	do,	other	banks	have	the	right	to	call	their	loans	for	immediate	repayment.		For	 individual	 households	 no	 collective	 ceiling	 in	 their	 mortgage	 borrowing	levels	was	ever	applied.	Therefore	the	collective	gearing	ratio	of	debt	to	income	was	 stretched	 to	 breaking	 point.	 Secondly	 mortgage	 lending	 finances	 the	acquisition	of	homes.		It	should	do	so	by	acquiring	(new)	homes	without	driving	up	house	prices	faster	than	the	CPI	inflation	levels.	When,	like	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	 1997-2007,	 enough	 new	 homes	 were	 built	 to	 satisfy	 the	 growth	 in	population	 and	 the	 change	 in	 household	 composition	 and	 tastes,	 the	mortgage	lending	volumes	should	have	been	kept	in	line	with	the	need	for	such	homes.	In	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1997-2003	the	mortgage	lending	levels	not	only	financed	new	homes,	 but	 also	did	 this	 in	 a	manner,	which	drove	up	house	prices	 faster	than	 the	 income	 growth	 of	 mortgagors.	 Tables	 1-3	 in	 the	 next	 section	 will	demonstrate	these	effects.	In	other	situations,	like	in	the	U.K.,	where,	over	many	years,	too	few	homes	were	built,	to	keep	up	with	population	growth	levels,	house	price	 inflation	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 low	 levels	 of	 new	 house	 building.	Mortgage	levels	become	inflated	as	a	result	of	such	low	levels	of	construction.		In	both	countries	the	collective	mortgage	debt	to	income	level	and	to	asset	prices	can	be	stretched	to	breaking	point.			
	
1.1	Tools	to	measure	systemic	risks	for	U.S.	households	
	Basically	two	tools	can	identify	the	built	up	of	systemic	risks	for	households.	The	first	 tool	 compares	 the	 total	 outstanding	mortgage	debt	with	 the	nominal	GDP	level	of	the	same	year	and	shows	how	–from	a	balanced	base	year-	the	mortgage	debt	level	compares	with	the	nominal	GDP	level.	This	tool	is	a	reflection	of	the																			
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											G-SIBOs	(Global	Systemically	Important	But	Overlooked)	The	Collective	of	U.S.	Households©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			systemic	 risks	 arising	 from	 the	 collective	 mortgage	 debt	 compared	 to	 the	collective	income	levels:	the	CMDI	index.																				Table	1	shows	the	result	of	such	comparison		
Table	1:	Collective	Mortgage	Debt	to	Income	level	(1997	=	100)	in	the	U.S.	
	
Year	
	
Total	
Mortgage	
Debt	as	%	of	
Nominal	
GDP	
1997=100	
Year	 Total	
Mortgage	
Debt	as	%	of	
Nominal	
GDP	
Year	 Total	
Mortgage	
Debt	as	%	of	
Nominal	
GDP	
1997	
	
43.6%	=	100	 2003	 139.0	 2009	 165.8	
1998	
	
102.3	 2004	 146.8	 2010	 152.1	
1999	
	
105.3	 2005	 156.2	 2011	 143.3	
2000	
	
107.3	 2006	 164.0	 2012	 134.6	
2001	
	
114.9	 2007	 168.1	 2013	 129.1	
2002	
	
125.9	 2008	 164.9	 2014	
	
2015	
123.9	
	
120.6	
	
	This	CMDI	tool	shows	how	collectively	there	was	no	ceiling	in	place	on	mortgage	lending	between	1997	and	2007.	The	CMDI	lending	index	as	compared	to	income	levels	 moved	 from	 100	 in	 1997	 to	 168.1	 in	 2007.	 After	 2005	 the	 level	 of	foreclosures	rose	substantially	causing	house	prices	to	drop	steeply	and	the	level	of	new	housing	starts	to	drop	from	1.7	million	new	housing	starts	in	2003	to	536	thousand	in	2010.			The	 second	 tool	 is	 aimed	 to	 show	 the	 pressures	 on	 owner-occupiers	 with	 a	mortgage.	 This	 tool	 measures	 the	 money	 input	 in	 the	 U.S.	 housing	 market	compared	to	the	average	U.S.	home	sales	price:	the	MIAHS	index.		
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Table	2:	Annual	mortgage	lending	divided	by	average	U.S.	home	sales	price	
	
	
Year	
	
Mortgage	
per	new	
home	
divided	by	
Avg	Sales	
Price	
Year	
	
Mortgage	
per	new	
home	
divided	by	
Avg	Sales	
Price	
Year	
	
Mortgage	
per	new	
home	
divided	by	
Avg	Sales	
Price	
1997	
	
1.29	 2004	 2.41	 2011	 0.63	
1998	
	
1.52	 2005	 2.20	 2012	 0.50	
1999	
	
1.64	 2006	 2.50	 2013	 0.95	
2000	
	
1.68	 2007	 2.53	 2014	 0.97	
2001	
	
2.05	 2008	 1.18	 2015	 1.00	
2002	
	
2.43	 2009	 1.27	 2016	 	
2003	
	
2.58	 2010	 negative	 	 	
		In	table	2	it	has	been	assumed	that	all	annual	new	mortgage-lending	levels	were	used	 to	 finance	 the	 annual	 new	 housing	 starts.	 This	 amount	 per	 new	 home	 is	subsequently	compared	with	the	average	U.S.	house	sales	price.	Annex	1,	table	4,	contains	all	basic	data	that	have	been	used	in	table	2.		Table	2	shows	that,	 in	1997,	the	mortgage	lending	volume	would	have	meant	a	mortgage	per	each	newly	built	home	of	1.29	times	the	average	sales	price	for	U.S.	homes.	 In	 1997	 the	 lending	 volume	 already	 caused	 upward	 pressure	 on	 the	average	home	price.	This	pressure	became	all	the	greater	over	subsequent	years.		By	2003,	the	volume	of	lending	per	each	new	home	reached	double	the	level	of	1997.	One	may	conclude,	that	in	2003	there	was	already	a	systemic	crisis	in	the	U.S.	 mortgage	 market.	 From	 2002	 average	 house	 prices	 accelerated	 well	 into	2007.	The	cumulative	effect	of	all	these	mortgage	loans	as	compared	to	income	levels	shows	up	well	 in	table	1	as	the	CMDI	index	of	 loans	to	 income	increased	from	a	factor	100	in	1997	to	168	by	2007.			In	order	to	eliminate	from	the	equation	the	pressure	element	of	high	mortgage	volumes	on	house	prices,	table	3	has	been	developed.	Table	3	shows	the	indices	based	on	the	average	home	sales	price	from	1997	as	base	and	corrected	in	line	with	the	CPI	index	over	the	following	years.		
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Table	3:	Volume	of	mortgage	lending	allocated	to	new	housing	starts	with	
average	house	prices	adjusted	from	1997	on	CPI	basis.	
	
Year	
	
	
Volume	
index	based	
on	CPI	
adjusted		
basis		
Year		 Volume	index	based	
on	CPI	
adjusted		
basis		
Year		 Volume	index	based	
on	CPI	
adjusted		
basis		
1997	
	
1.29	 2004	 3.19	 2011	 0.70	
1998	
	
1.54	 2005	 3.05	 2012	 0.58	
1999	
	
1.75	 2006	 3.45	 2013	 1.21	
2000	
	
1.84	 2007	 3.49	 2014	 1.22	
2001	
	
2.25	 2008	 1.46	 2015	 1.38	
2002	
	
2.81	 2009	 1.51	 2016	 	
2003	
	
3.15	 2010	 negative	 	 		
	The	 systemic	 risks	 to	households	 are	 clearly	demonstrated	by	 tables	1-3.	Debt	levels,	incomes	and	house	prices	are	interlinked.	In	2003	the	3.15	volume	index	is	 far	 above	 the	 macro-economic	 affordability	 level.	 This	 level	 increased	 even	further	in	2006-2007.		Over	 the	 period	 1997-2007,	 there	 was	 no	 macro-economic	 mortgage-lending	ceiling	 in	 place.	 Managing	 such	 a	 ceiling	 cannot	 be	 done	 at	 the	 level	 of	 a	household;	 all	 the	micro	 decisions	 on	 granting	mortgages	 did	 not	 add	 up	 to	 a	sustainable	macro-economic	level.	Just	like	in	the	case	of	the	large	conglomerate,	each	 additional	 loan	 per	 time	 period	 weakens	 the	 quality	 of	 all	 outstanding	loans.	
	
	
2.	Managing	systemic	risks	for	U.S.	households	
	
2.1	System	deficiencies	
	
The	collective	banking	system	
	The	U.S.	banking	system	was	and	is	incapable	of	maintaining	a	lending	ceiling	on	the	 collective	 mortgage	 debt.	 Each	 obligor	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 separate	 entity	 and	 is	therefore	subject	to	an	individual	credit	worthiness	assessment.	Competition		
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																G-SIBOs	(Global	Systemically	Important	But	Overlooked)	The	Collective	of	U.S.	Households©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		between	 banks	 and	 the	 sale	 of	 such	 credit	 risks	 to	 mortgage	 bondholders	induced	banks	to	increase	the	collective	mortgage	lending	exposure	from	100%	of	nominal	GDP	in	1997	to	168%	by	2007.	The	reliance	on	individual	rather	than	on	the	collective	obligor	creditworthiness	led	to	the	systemic	risks	experienced	not	just	by	the	mortgagors,	but	equally	by	all	home	owners.	These	systemic	risks	then	 multiplied	 into	 affecting	 unemployment,	 household’	 income,	 government	debt	and	economic	growth	levels.		One	cannot	expect	an	individual	bank,	or	an	individual	mortgagor	to	change	their	behavior	in	order	to	fall	in	line	with	a	mortgage-lending	ceiling.	Other	measures	are	needed.	Such	measures	should	have	come	from	the	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Department	of	the	Treasury.		
The	interest	rate	instrument	
	The	interest	rate	instrument	is	a	short-term	instrument	to	help	correct	a	series	of	economic	failings,	such	as	reducing	inflation	levels	when	prices	are	regarded	as	 increasing	 too	 rapidly.	 The	 instrument	 is	 also	 used	 to	 stimulate	 economic	activity	 when	 unemployment	 levels	 are	 regarded	 as	 being	 too	 high.	 What	 an	upward	 change	 in	 interest	 rate	 can	 also	 do,	 is	 to	 increase	 the	 costs	 of	 new	mortgage	 borrowings.	When	 variable	 interest	 rates	 are	 applied	 to	 a	mortgage	contract,	 such	 a	 change	 in	 interest	 rates	 affects	 all	 existing	 variable	 rate	mortgages	as	well	as	new	mortgage	obligations.		What	 an	 interest	 adjustment	 cannot	 do	 is	 to	 change	 the	 existing	 volume	 of	outstanding	mortgage	debt.	In	other	words	if	a	ceiling	on	mortgage	lending	was	not	applied	in	previous	years,	a	change	in	interest	rate,	especially	of	the	upward	type,	does	not	resolve	the	systemic	risks	created	by	previous	lending	excesses.	If	many	mortgages	 are	 based	 on	 a	 variable	 interest	 rate,	 an	 increase	 in	 interest	rates	 may	 actually	 harm	 obligors’	 ability	 to	 service	 the	 outstanding	 mortgage	portfolio	obligations.	 In	conclusion	 the	use	of	 the	 interest	 rate	 instrument	 is	of	little	use	for	correcting	an	existing	mortgage	lending	volume,	if	in	previous	years	a	ceiling	on	lending	was	not	applied.		
	
Quantitative	easing	
	Quantitative	easing	cannot	help	 in	 lowering	 the	 level	of	outstanding	mortgages	when	a	 ceiling	on	 the	 level	of	 such	mortgages	was	not	 enforced.	 It	 can	help	 in	debtor	 substitution,	 in	 that	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 buys	 up	 mortgage-backed	securities,	as	it	has	done	to	the	tune	of	$1.7	trillion.	These	bonds	are	still	on	the	books	of	the	Fed	at	the	time	of	writing	this	paper.	However	debtor	substitution	offers	no	help	 to	households,	who	are	 forced	 into	 foreclosure	proceedings	as	a	consequence	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 macro-economic	 management	 of	 the	 mortgage-	lending	levels.	
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Collecting	outstanding	mortgage	debt	
	Systemic	 risks	 were	 also	 applicable	 when	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 system	 started	 its	recovery	process	on	outstanding	mortgage	debt.	23.250	million	households	were	affected	by	foreclosure	proceedings	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	2005-2014.	This	was	more	than	45%	of	all	homeowners	who	had	a	mortgage	in	2007.	Ultimately	6,145,000	 homes	 were	 repossessed	 over	 the	 period	 2006-2014.	 The	 latter	number	was	equivalent	 to	at	 least	 four	years	of	new	housing	 starts	during	 the	period	of	1998-2006.		Over	 the	 period	 1997-2007,	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 system	was	 unable	 to	 enforce	 a	collective	mortgage-lending	ceiling	over	its	mortgage-lending	activities.	Over	the	period	2008-2014	 the	excessive	 lending	 levels	were	 counteracted	by	excessive	recovery	actions	to	reclaim	the	outstanding	mortgages;	these	actions	also	caused	house	prices	to	drop	far	more	than	needed	if	a	mortgage	ceiling	had	been	applied	in	previous	years.			All	these	actions	are	fully	understandable	from	an	individual	bank’s	point	of	view	as	they	strive	for	profits	and	are	responsible	to	their	shareholders	for	the	actions	taken.	However	on	a	collective	basis	these	actions	greatly	increased	the	systemic	risks	 to	 individual	 households	 in	 their	 consumer	 spending	 behavior,	 their	employment	 chances,	 their	 future	 income	 growth	 chances	 and	 the	 costs	associated	with	the	doubling	of	U.S.	government’	debt	levels	between	2008	and	2015.		
2.2	Managing	systemic	risks	for	individual	households	
	The	main	aim	of	managing	systemic	risks	for	individual	households	is	to	ensure	that	 a	 mortgage-lending	 ceiling	 is	 assessed	 and	 subsequently	 adhered	 to.	 The	second	aim	is	to	take	countervailing	actions	in	case	the	ceiling	levels	have	been	broken.		It	 is	no	solution	just	to	force	banks	to	improve	their	loan	loss	shock	absorption	capacity	 if	 simultaneously	 no	 steps	 are	 taken	 to	 manage	 a	 mortgage-lending	ceiling.	 Systemic	 risks	 on	 households	 can	 be	 avoided	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 it	 will	improve	the	banking	sector’s	profitability	over	existing	home	mortgages.	It	will	also	have	a	positive	spin	off	for	economic	growth	levels	and	for	improving	levels	of	employment	and	income	for	individual	households.	The	extensive	use	of	 low	interest	rates	and	quantitative	easing	would	not	have	been	needed.		In	two	previous	papers:	“The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States”	and	the	 “A	 review	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 its	 effects	 on	 working	 class	households-	 a	 tale	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 neglect”,	 the	 impact	 of	 not	managing	 a	mortgage-lending	ceiling	has	been	extensively	discussed.	Also	the	costs	in	terms	of	 lost	 economic	 growth,	 unemployment	 and	 household	 income	 growth,	 the	doubling	of	U.S.	government	debt	and	the	drop	in	homeownership	rates	were	all	set	out.	
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										G-SIBOs	(Global	Systemically	Important	But	Overlooked)	The	Collective	of	U.S.	Households©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			Two	main	 solutions	were	 suggested.	 One	was	 aimed	 at	 enforcing	 a	mortgage-	lending	ceiling	system:	“A	traffic	light	system	for	the	banking	world”,	indicating	whether	the	speed	of	 lending	was	satisfactory	(green	 light),	was	somewhat	too	fast	(amber	warning)	or	was	excessive	(red	indication).	Violating	the	traffic	rules	would	 incur	 penalties	 for	 banks	 and	 other	 lenders,	 especially	 when	 the	indication	was	red.		The	second	solution	was	for	the	situation	that	a	mortgage-lending	ceiling	had	not	been	 enforced.	 In	 such	 case	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 a	 National	 Mortgage	 Bank	 was	recommended	to	help	households	overcome	the	liquidity	squeeze	that	has	made	the	past	decade	show	such	low	economic	growth	rates.	Such	an	NMB	could	act	as	a	 lender	of	 last	 resort	 for	 individual	households	on	basis	of	sharing	part	of	 the	asset	 (the	 home)	 with	 the	 NMB	 for	 its	 cash-flow	 help.	 Such	 help	 should	 be	differentiated	 for	 each	 income	 class	 that	 an	 individual	 household	 belongs	 to.	Low-income	earners	should	be	helped	most.		
2.3	Priorities	for	an	economic	recovery		The	subprime	lending	levels	only	really	took	off	in	2004	as	the	next	chart	shows:		
Chart	1	U.S.	Subprime	Lending	1997-2007		
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																G-SIBOs	(Global	Systemically	Important	But	Overlooked)	The	Collective	of	U.S.	Households©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Already	from	2003,	alarm	bells	should	have	started	ringing	as	can	be	seen	from	Table	 1.	 The	 systemic	 risks	 to	 households	 preceded	 the	 systemic	 risks	 to	 the	banking	 sector	 by	 about	 four	 years.	 The	 systemic	 risks	 to	 households	 also	preceded	 the	 great	 increase	 in	 subprime	 origination	 as	 Chart	 1	 shows.	 The	substantially	 increased	 levels	 of	 such	 origination	 and	 the	 mixing	 of	 subprime	with	 prime	 mortgages	 in	 the	 mortgage	 bond	 securitization	 process	 over	 the	period	2004	to	2007,	led	to	the	mortgage	bond	crisis	of	2007.	It	was	in	2007,	that	BNP	Paribas	declared	that	three	of	 its	mortgage	bond	funds	could	no	longer	be	traded	as	liquidity	in	the	market	had	evaporated.		The	reason	that	the	recovery	period	took	so	long	-from	2007-2008	to	well	 into	2015-	 was	 that	 priority	 was	 given	 to	 rescuing	 the	 banking	 system	 and	 the	mortgage	 bondholders	 rather	 than	 putting	 the	 collective	 of	 individual	households	 first.	 If	 the	 latter	had	been	done,	 the	 crisis	would	have	been	much	less	 severe	 and	 the	 costs	 to	 U.S.	 households	 much	 less	 also.	 As	 it	 was,	 U.S.	government	 debt	 has	 doubled	 over	 the	 period	 2007-2016	 by	 an	 amount	 of	$10.55	trillion.	 In	1997	total	U.S.	mortgage	debt	amounted	to	only	$3.7	trillion.	The	debt	did	rise	to	$10.7	trillion	by	the	end	of	the	second	quarter	2008.			In	conclusion:	the	absence	of	a	mortgage-lending	ceiling	led	to	U.S.	government	debt	doubling,	affecting	all	households.	All	households	paid	the	price	for	ignoring	the	 systemic	 risk	 to	 mortgagors,	 but	 the	 lower	 income	 households	 paid	 the	highest	price.		Managing	 systemic	 risks	 for	 individual	 households	 is	 not	 just	 an	 option,	 but	 a	necessity	 if	 the	 aim	 of	 a	 society	 is	 for	 faster	 economic	 growth,	 higher	 home	ownership	 rates	 and	 a	 better	 help	 for	 those	 who	 need	 to	 borrow	 in	 order	 to	acquire	a	home.			Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood	U.K.	19th	December	2016			
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Annex	1	
	
Table	 4:	 Annual	 mortgage	 lending	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2015	 compared	 to	
funds	allocated	per	new	home	started	and	to	the	average	home	price	for	homes	
sold	in	the	U.S.			
	
Year	
									1	
Annual	new	
Mortgage	
Lending	volume	
X	U.S.	billion	
											2	
Allocated	per	each	
New	housing	
Start	
X	U.S.	dollars	
									3	
Average	U.S.	
Home	Sales	Price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
2	
						4	
Annual	
Housing	starts	
X	million	
3	
1997	 125	+	216=			341	 227,580	 176,200	 1.494	
1998	 135	+	302=			437	 276,230	 181,900	 1.582	
1999	 148	+	376=			524	 320,310	 195,600	 1.635	
2000	 161	+	383=			544	 348,620	 207,000	 1.559	
2001	 177	+	508=			685	 437.400	 213,200	 1.567	
2002	 201	+	706=			907	 555,360	 228,700	 1.633	
2003	 230	+	882=		1112	 635,300	 246,300	 1.751	
2004	 262	+	949=		1211	 662,480	 274,500	 1.828	
2005	 297	+1054=	1351	 653,290				 297,000	 2.068	
2006	 330	+	997	=	1327	 763,960	 305,900	 1.737	
2007	 354	+	703	=	1057	 794,740	 313,600	 1.330	
2008	 352	-			33			=				319	 345,612	 292,600	 		.923	
2009	 347	–	161		=			186	 344,450	 270,900	 		.540	
2010	 331	-		498		=		-167	 negative	 272,900	 		.536	
2011	 323	–	219		=			104	 167,580	 263,400	 		.623	
2012	 316		-	211		=			105	 142,430	 285,400	 		.740	
2013	 313	-				90		=				223	 301,890	 319,300	 		.898	
2014	 313	-						1		=					312	 304,480	 312.500	 1.026	
2015	 316	+			91	=					407	 350,900	 352,500	 1.161	
2016	 	 	 361,900	
(Jan-June)	
1.189	(June	
annualized)			The	$125	billion	mentioned	for	1997	in	column	1	of	table	4	reflects	the	repayments	volume	out	of	the	total	outstanding	U.S.	home	mortgage	portfolio.		The	figure	assumes	a	 straight-line	 repayment	 schedule	 over	 a	 thirty-year	 mortgage	 period.	 The	 same	applies	 for	 the	 $135	 billion	 in	 1998,	 etc.	 Column	 1	 reflects	 the	 total	 production	volume	of	new	mortgages	granted	per	year.		It	reflects	the	net	annual	volume	increase	in	outstanding	mortgage	levels	plus	the	repayments	made	during	the	year.	The	latter	need	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 lending	 levels	 in	 order	 to	 get	 the	 volume	 of	 mortgage	lending	correct.		In	line	with	the	rapid	growth	of	the	total	outstanding	mortgage	portfolio	as	shown	in	table	1,	 the	 replacement	 factor	of	mortgage	repayments	 increases	annually	 to	2008	and	shows	a	slight	decline	thereafter.																																																										2	http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf	3	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HOUST	
